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1804 
Article 
Are State Constitutions Constitutional? 
Timothy M. Tymkovich†
During Reconstruction, Senator Charles Sumner from 
Massachusetts famously referred to the Guarantee Clause as 
the “sleeping giant” of the Constitution.
 
1 Radical Republicans 
like Sumner believed that the Clause’s command that “[t]he 
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government”2 could be used as a tool for 
reforming the governments of the Confederate states.3 But 
nearly 150 years later, the giant has still not awakened. Article 
IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution has not emerged as a tool 
to police the structure of state government. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has long refused even to adjudicate claims under 
the Guarantee Clause—they are nonjusticiable.4
At first glance, the courts’ historical reluctance to adjudi-
cate such claims is striking in light of the Clause’s seemingly 
simple language. It tracks the logical inference that a Union 
cannot be established if some of its members are monarchies, 
 
 
†  Judge Timothy M. Tymkovich sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit. He previously served as the Solicitor General for the Office of 
the Attorney General of Colorado. Judge Tymkovich received his J.D. from the 
University of Colorado and his Bachelors in Political Science from the Colora-
do College. He appreciates the assistance of Teresa Helms and Will Johnston 
in preparing this article. Copyright © 2013 by Timothy M. Tymkovich. 
 1. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTI-
TUTION 2 (1972). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  
 3. See David Tyack & Robert Lowe, The Constitutional Moment: Recon-
struction and Black Education in the South, 94 AM. J. EDUC. 236, 238 (1986).  
 4. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980) 
(“We do not reach the merits of the appellants’ argument that the Act violates 
the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, since that issue is not justiciable.”), super-
seded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1), as recognized in Northwest Austin 
Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 209–10 (2009); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224 (1962) (“[T]he Court has consistently held that a chal-
lenge to state action based on the Guaranty [sic] Clause presents no justiciable 
question . . . .”). 
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aristocracies, or dictatorships.5 But the Clause’s text does not 
indicate how or by whom this clause is to be enforced. No hints 
suggest the kinds of limits the Clause places on state govern-
ments. And despite historical clues gleaned from the Founders’ 
concept of a republican government,6 the Constitution does not 
articulate clear standards for determining whether a particular 
government adheres to a “republican form.”7
The use of “republican” suggests that the state must have 
some form of representative government, but the variation 
could be quite wide. Must state government look like the feder-
al government, with a bicameral legislature that makes all the 
law? Or can the power rest with the people through various 
forms of direct democracy? The absence of standards explains 
much of the judicial reluctance to wade into this definitional 
thicket.  
  
This Article will examine several legal questions that 
might arise in disputes involving the Guarantee Clause. First, 
what is the state of the law over district court jurisdiction to 
hear the merits of the Guarantee Clause challenge? Second, at 
what point does the Guarantee Clause become a limit on the 
state’s ability to structure its government in a way that is at 
odds with the federal model? 
Part I will discuss the original meaning of the Guarantee 
Clause and the line of cases that applied the political question 
doctrine to claims arising under the Clause. Part II will address 
the definitional boundaries on what constitutes a republican 
government in light of state procedures authorizing the refer-
endum and initiative, so-called direct democracy. Part III will 
consider whether courts are likely to find claims under the 
Guarantee Clause against voter initiative to be justiciable.  
 
 5. MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1650 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 193 (James Madison) (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 2009) (defining a republic as “a government which derives all its 
powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is adminis-
tered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or 
during good behavior”). 
 7. See, e.g., Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guar-
antee Clause Regulation of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1716 
(2010) (“While scholars have shed light on what the Guarantee Clause covers, 
how the Clause is implemented has been drastically underevaluated.”). 
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I.  DEBATE OVER THE MEANING OF THE GUARANTEE 
CLAUSE   
A. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CLAUSE 
Considerable debate animates the scholarship over the 
original purposes and understanding of the Clause.8 Some 
commentators argue that the Clause’s purpose is narrowly lim-
ited to preventing states from becoming monarchies, dictator-
ships, or aristocracies.9 Others maintain that the Clause was 
intended to be a broader restriction on state government.10
One logical way to begin an analysis of constitutional 
words, phrases, and clauses is with a presumption that the 
Framers of the Constitution intended the words they used to 
have the meaning they understood them to have. Accordingly, 
the historical context giving rise to the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides valuable instruction on how to interpret the text and 
structure of Constitution, including the Guarantee Clause. How 
would an objective, well-informed person understand the mean-
ing of the text in question?
 
11
A central concept in American constitutionalism is “[t]hat 
all lawful power derives from the people and must be held in 
check to preserve their freedom.”
  
12 “A system of government in 
which the people hold sovereign power and elect representa-
tives who exercise that power” is commonly known as a “repub-
lic.”13 A republican government is distinguishable from a “pure 
democracy,” in which the people as a whole hold and exercise 
the sovereign power of the government, and from a governmen-
tal regime ruled by one person or an elite group.14
 
 8. For list of scholarly authorities discussing appropriate uses of the 
Guarantee Clause, see id. at 1713–16 nn.4–14. 
 In Federalist 
No. 39, James Madison defined a “republic” as “a government 
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great 
 9. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy?—
Initiative, Referendum, and the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 807, 824–25 (2002). 
 10. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 7, at 1716 (stating that “[g]iven the ex-
treme unlikelihood that a state will crown a king or descend into anarchy,” the 
idea that the Guarantee Clause is not implicated unless a state completely 
ceases to be republican in form “ensures its desuetude”). 
 11. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTER-
PRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 78–90 (2012).  
 12. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6–7 (3rd ed. 
2000). 
 13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1418 (9th ed. 2009). 
 14. Id. 
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body of the people, and is administered by persons holding 
their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good 
behavior.”15 The Framers of the Constitution provided for the 
indirect exercise of sovereign power because they believed that 
human rights were best protected when shielded by “deliberate-
ly fragmented centers of countervailing power.”16 To them, cen-
tralized accumulation of power in any person or single group of 
persons meant tyranny, whereas the division and separation of 
powers meant liberty.17
One of the original aims of the Constitution was to address 
the defects associated with the Articles of Confederation.
  
18 The 
idea that a guarantee of republican government was necessary 
grew from the recognition of one defect in particular—the Arti-
cles of Confederation gave the federal government no power to 
suppress a rebellion in any state.19 In a letter to Edmund Ran-
dolph dated April 8, 1787, James Madison wrote: “An article 
ought to be inserted expressly guarantying [sic] the tranquility 
of the States agst. [sic] internal as well as external dangers.”20 
Madison later explained that the national government’s power 
to guarantee a republican form of government in the states was 
necessary “[i]n a confederacy founded on republican princi-
ples . . . to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial 
innovations.”21 At the Constitutional Convention, proponents of 
the guarantee explained that the purpose of securing a republi-
can government was to secure the states against dangerous 
commotions, insurrections, and rebellions.22
Indeed, the proximate motivation for the Clause’s insertion 
was likely Shays’s Rebellion, an armed movement of aggrieved 
  
 
 15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 6, at 193 (James Madison); see 
also PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 1650.  
 16. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 7.  
 17. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 6, (Alexander Hamilton), 
NOS. 10, 41, 47, 51 (James Madison). 
 18. See WIECEK, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing the development of the 
Guarantee Clause and the Founders’ determination that it be “more effective” 
than the Articles of Confederation). 
 19. See id. (mentioning how the Articles of Confederation prevented the 
Confederation Congress from taking action to suppress Shays’s Rebellion). 
 20. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), 
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document= 
1584.  
 21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 6, at 222 (James Madison). 
 22. 5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 332–33 (1891). 
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farmers and debtors in Western Massachusetts.23 The rebels 
prevented the enforcement of debts and the collection of taxes, 
which caused great alarm among the governing and merchant 
classes.24 The prospect of state government descending into 
lawlessness convinced many of the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention that the new national government needed 
the authority, if necessary, to send in troops to end mob rule 
and reestablish representative government.25 The new Consti-
tution, with the Guarantee Clause in Article IV, would provide 
that authority.26
B. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AS A BAR TO JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION 
 
Despite the broad wording of the Guarantee Clause, courts 
have not ventured to decide whether the Clause extends beyond 
its apparent historical purpose of authorizing the suppression 
of insurrections. Courts mostly decline to exercise jurisdiction 
over Guarantee Clause challenges.27 In many of the cases in 
which litigants have asked the Supreme Court to apply the 
Clause, the Court has found the claims to be nonjusticiable “po-
litical questions.”28 State courts have also been reluctant to de-
cide the merits of challenges brought under the Guarantee 
Clause.29 As a result, the Clause has been an infrequent basis 
for litigation. Some scholars and litigants, however, argue that 
the merits of such claims should be decided by the courts.30
 
 23. Jonathon K. Waldrop, Note, Rousing the Sleeping Giant? Federalism 
and the Guarantee Clause, 15 J.L. & POL. 267, 272 (1999). 
 
 24. For a discussion and overview of Shays’s Rebellion, see WIECEK, supra 
note 1, at 27–42. 
 25. See id. at 27–33. Some have argued, however, that even in the absence 
of the Rebellion the Constitution would have resembled its current form. See, 
e.g., Robert A. Feer, Shays’s Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causa-
tion, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 388, 410 (1969). 
 26. Authority to end internal violence is authorized by the Domestic Vio-
lence Clause, also contained within Section 4 of Article IV. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 4. 
 27. See Heller, supra note 7, at 1727. 
 28. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980), 
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 1973b(a)(1), as recognized in Northwest Aus-
tin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 209–10 (2009); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218–29 (1962); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 
U.S. 118, 140–51 (1912).  
 29. See, e.g., Hammond v. Clark, 71 S.E. 479, 489 (Ga. 1911); Kadderly v. 
City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 719 (Or. 1903). 
 30. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause 
Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 868–69 (1994); Heller, supra 
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In Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall anticipated the 
political question doctrine when he stated: “Questions in their 
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, 
submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”31 
The modern prudentially based political question doctrine in-
structs Article III courts to avoid deciding questions that the 
Supreme Court deems more suitable for other branches of gov-
ernment, even if all the other jurisdictional and justiciability 
requirements for adjudication are met.32 The Court has stated 
that the political question doctrine “is designed to restrain the 
Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the 
other branches of Government.”33
To understand the doctrine, one must examine the specific 
areas in which the Supreme Court has applied it. One way to 
organize these cases is by the type of legal issue in dispute. The 
Supreme Court has deemed the following challenges to be polit-
ical questions: claims arising under the Guarantee Clause,
 
34 
challenges to constitutional amendments,35 suits involving the 
validity of foreign or military affairs,36 disputes over the propri-
ety of congressional self-governance,37 and controversies regard-
ing impeachment.38
Another way to address political question precedent is by 
focusing on the Baker factors. In Baker v. Carr,
  
39
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
 the Supreme 
Court identified six criteria that a court should consider when 
deciding whether a particular case presents a political ques-
tion:  
 
note 7, at 1749–52. 
 31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
 32. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 33. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990).  
 34. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (stating that under the 
Guarantee Clause, “it rests with Congress to decide what government is the 
established one in a State”). 
 35. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457–59 (1939) (plurality opinion). 
 36. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918) (holding that an 
action in Mexico “of the legitimate Mexican government . . . is not subject to 
reexamination and modification by the courts of this country”).  
 37. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U.S. 486 (1969) (holding justiciable the question of the substance of congres-
sional qualifications but not the decision of whether a member satisfied those 
qualifications).  
 38. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 39. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of 
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.40
The six “Baker factors,” however, have confused courts because 
the factors are subject to varied interpretations and do not 
amount to a clear rule. For example, Nixon v. United States
 
41 
involved a dispute under the Impeachment Clause, which pro-
vides, in part: “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments. . . .”42
Applying the Baker factors, the Court found that im-
peachment procedure was a textually demonstrated commit-
ment to another branch—the Court stated that “the word ‘sole’ 
indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate and no-
where else.”
 Walter L. Nixon, a former federal judge, 
was impeached by the Senate. Nixon sought review of the Sen-
ate’s impeachment procedure (which involved the use of a 
committee to take testimony and gather evidence), claiming 
that the Senate failed to give him a full evidentiary hearing be-
fore the entire Senate. The Supreme Court decided that the 
Senate had sole discretion to establish impeachment proce-
dures and thus the issue presented a political question.  
43 The Court also determined that there were no ju-
dicially manageable standards for resolving the issue—the Im-
peachment Clause’s use of the word “try” lacked “sufficient 
precision” to allow for judicial interpretation.44
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that cases alleging 
a violation of the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable po-
litical questions.
  
45 Luther v. Borden46 is generally regarded as 
the seminal case.47 The dispute in Luther involved two rival 
governments that were each vying to be the legal government 
of Rhode Island.48
 
 40. Id. at 217 (numbering added). 
 In the 1840s, Rhode Island was governed by 
 41. Nixon, 506 U.S. 224. 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 43. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229. 
 44. Id. at 230. 
 45. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 154 (5th ed. 2007). 
 46. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).  
 47. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 154. 
 48. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35–37. 
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an old royal charter that had been established in the seven-
teenth century. When a new state constitution was proposed 
and ratified in 1841, the incumbent government enacted a law 
prohibiting elections under the new constitution and imposed 
martial law.49
The Supreme Court declined to address the merits of the 
case because it posed a nonjusticiable political question. The 
Court held that the question presented was for congressional, 
not judicial, resolution: “For as the United States guarantee to 
each state a republican government, Congress must necessarily 
decide what government is established in the State before it 
can determine whether it is republican or not.”
 Martin Luther was an election commissioner un-
der the new government. In 1842, Sheriff Luther Borden broke 
into Luther’s home to search for evidence of illegal electioneer-
ing activity, and Luther sued for trespass. Borden asserted that 
the search was a lawful exercise of his governmental power but 
Luther argued that Rhode Island’s charter was not “republican” 
in character and that Borden acted pursuant to an unconstitu-
tional government’s orders.  
50
Since deciding Luther, the Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly found that a state government or state action violates 
the Guarantee Clause.
 The Court 
thus let stand the new state constitution and left Luther to his 
fate. 
51 But the Court has held that such 
claims are nonjusticiable.52 In Pacific States Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. Oregon,53 for example, the Court addressed allega-
tions that a republican form of government is one in which the 
people of a state must elect representatives to govern; direct 
democracy was claimed to be antithetical to a republican gov-
ernment.54
 
 49. See WIECEK, supra note 
 The case concerned an amendment to Oregon’s con-
stitution adopting voter initiative and referendum. A law tax-
ing certain classes of corporations was then passed pursuant to 
the amendment, and an Oregon corporation neglected to pay 
the tax. When the State sued to collect the tax, the corporation 
defended on the theory that the adoption of the initiative and 
1, at 113. 
 50. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42. The Court also noted that allowing ju-
dicial challenges to the lawful authority of state governments would create 
practical difficulties. Id. at 44.  
 51. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 154. 
 52. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133 (1912); 
Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578–79 (1900).  
 53. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 118. 
 54. Id. at 136–38. 
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referendum destroyed all government republican in form in Or-
egon. The Court found that the claim at issue was a political 
question because the assault was “not on the tax as a tax, but 
on the State as a State.”55 The Court highlighted the difference 
between “the legislative duty to determine the political ques-
tions involved in deciding whether a state government republi-
can in form exists, and “the judicial power and ever-present du-
ty . . . to enforce and uphold the applicable provisions of the 
Constitution as to each and every exercise of governmental 
power.”56
Today, however, the justiciability barrier may not be as 
formidable as it once was. In New York v. United States,
 Despite not reaching the merits of the Guarantee 
Clause claim, Pacific States ensured that the initiative process 
would remain free from Guarantee Clause challenges in the 
years that followed. 
57 the 
Court signaled a possible shift in the justiciability of Guarantee 
Clause claims. The case involved a challenge by the state of 
New York against federal legislation that, among other things, 
forced the states to “take title” to low-level radioactive waste. 
While the central holding of New York was that this “take title” 
provision violated the Tenth Amendment, the Court also ad-
dressed New York’s Guarantee Clause claim and whether it 
was justiciable. The Court noted that Luther’s “limited holding” 
about who could decide the legitimacy of the Rhode Island gov-
ernment had “metamorphosed into the sweeping assertion that 
‘[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of gov-
ernment in States cannot be challenged in the courts.’”58 Prior 
to the elevation of Luther “into a general rule of 
nonjusticiability,” the Court noted that it had “addressed the 
merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause without any 
suggestion that the claims were not justiciable.”59 Though the 
Court intimated that courts could reach the merits of Guaran-
tee Clause claims, “at least in some circumstances,” it opted not 
to lay down a general rule because New York’s claims would 
have failed on the merits anyways.60
 
 55. Id. at 150. 
 The Supreme Court’s sug-
gestion that the justiciability barrier is not absolute may have 
 56. Id. 
 57. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 58. Id. at 184 (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 185–86. 
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implications for the judiciary’s role in considering popularly 
enacted state provisions. 
II.  THE CONTRADICTORY NATURE OF 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT   
A. STATE VOTER INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 
The initiative and referendum are forms of direct democra-
cy that arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries.61 Since then, direct-legislation devices have been used by 
many states to guide and formulate state policy.62 The citizens 
of several states have embraced the concept of popular partici-
pation in the legislative process and some have amended their 
state constitutions to guarantee direct democracy.63
The initiative allows the people to propose state or local 
legislation through petitions, for enactment or rejection at the 
polls.
 
64 Voter initiatives can either enact or repeal laws, but the 
proposals must not exceed the scope of the government’s power. 
For example, the proposed law must not violate the Contracts 
Clause; it cannot be discriminatory, arbitrary, or unreasonable; 
and it cannot contravene state limits, statutes, or policy. The 
initiative process itself is considered political speech and is pro-
tected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution.65
Voter referendums also enable direct participation in the 
legislative process. When electorates are given the power to 
vote by referendum, they can require a legislative body to sub-
mit legislation to reexamination by the people. Many state con-
stitutions, charters, and statutes provide that a governing body 
must submit proposed action to referendum, reconsider legisla-
  
 
 61. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM, 255, 265–
66 (1959) (discussing the restoration of popular government). 
 62. Timothy M. Tymkovich, Colorado Survey: Recent Legislation and Col-
orado Supreme Court Decisions Referendum and Rezoning, 53 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 745, 749 (1982). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Natelson, supra note 9, at 808 n.2. 
 65. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192 
(1999) (finding that the First Amendment requires vigilance in judging the va-
lidity of restrictions on the initiative process); Yes on Term Limits, Inc. v. Sav-
age, 550 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that Oklahoma’s ban on 
non-resident petition circulators violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the U. S. Constitution). 
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tion upon a petition signed by a certain percent of voters, or 
subject enacted legislation to a popular referendum.66
Challenges to voter proposals through initiative and refer-
endum can be either procedural or substantive, and the ade-
quacy of a petition can be challenged in court.
 
67
Critics of participatory democracy assert that it has the po-
tential to destroy representative government as required by the 
U.S. Constitution.
 Sometimes pro-
posals are disqualified because they contain more than one 
subject or do not comport with other procedural requirements. 
A voter proposal will be disqualified when, if enacted, the 
measure would be unconstitutional on some other ground. 
68 Voter initiative and referendum procedures 
have also been criticized for allowing the exploitation of emo-
tional social issues, creating poorly drafted laws that are diffi-
cult to amend or repeal, incapacitating legislatures, and mo-
nopolizing the agenda of public discourse.69
Despite such criticisms, many states have a strong tradi-
tion of supporting direct legislation. For example, in 1910, Col-
orado voters overwhelmingly adopted a constitutional amend-
ment guaranteeing the initiative and referendum.
 Other problems 
arise when money is used for signature gathering and advertis-
ing.  
70 The 
amendment was codified in article V of the Colorado Constitu-
tion. When faced with challenges to the scope of the initiative 
and referendum, Colorado courts have generally deferred to the 
amendment, citing the enabling language of the state constitu-
tion, which states, “[a]ll political power is vested in and derived 
from the people.”71
B. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE 
 
Although the language of the Guarantee Clause seems to 
require each state in the Union to maintain a representative 
democracy, courts have generally allowed states to legislate 
 
 66. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art V, § 1. 
 67. See Craig B. Holman, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The 
Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1239, 1242–
44 (1998) (discussing ways to challenge voter initiatives). 
 68. Tymkovich, supra note 62, at 749. 
 69. See, e.g., Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of People to 
Make Fools of Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and Referendum, A 
Local Government Perspective, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 47, 77–84 (1995) (dis-
cussing problems in drafting, voter approval, and execution stages).  
 70. Id.  
 71. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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through voter initiative and referendum.72
For example, critics who oppose voter initiative and refer-
endum argue that the results of voter-controlled legislation can 
have a cumulative effect that undermines the republican na-
ture of state governments.
 A distinction, how-
ever, can be drawn that could result in a challenge to a voter 
initiative or referendum: an attack on the process of initiative 
and referendum may be different than an attack on the legisla-
tion that results from such process.  
73 In Death by a Thousand Cuts: The 
Guarantee Clause Regulation of State Constitutions, Jacob Hel-
ler argues that the Guarantee Clause should be used to invali-
date specific policies that threaten, but do not necessarily de-
stroy, a state’s republican form of government.74
But no court has examined specific provisions as testing 
those outer limits, nor has the Supreme Court suggested in any 
case that particular provisions resulting from the initiative 
process call into question the essential republicanism of state 
constitutions. 
 This reasoning 
is based on the premise that the question of when the outer 
limits imposed by the Guarantee Clause are triggered is one of 
degree. Thus, the initiative and referendum process itself may 
not be enough to implicate the Clause, but when the results of 
the process reach a certain degree of deviation from republican 
norms, they may become subject to the limits of the Clause.  
III.  THE CHALLENGE TO STATE-INITIATED MEASURES 
AND THE MEANING OF THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE   
If plaintiffs can clear the justiciability hurdle, the disposi-
tion of their claims will hinge on the proper interpretation of 
the Guarantee Clause. This depends in part on the how the 
Clause was intended to restrict state government. If the Clause 
was intended to prohibit only blatant state violations of funda-
mental republican concepts, then a state can argue that the 
Clause does not apply to run-of-the-mill constitutional provi-
 
 72. See, e.g., Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1995) (construing 
state constitutional provisions liberally in favor of the people’s right to exer-
cise the powers of initiative and referendum); Margolis v. Dist. Court, 638 P.2d 
297, 304–05 (Colo. 1981) (upholding the power of Colorado’s citizens to review 
rezoning decisions of municipal governments through referendum elections); 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Smith, 610 P.2d 794, 806 (Okla. 1980) (holding that the 
state legislature could not change a question pending before the people by ini-
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 73. See Heller, supra note 7, at 1713.  
 74. Id. at 1716. 
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sions—they do not turn state government into a monarchy or 
unauthorized outlier form of government. But if the purpose of 
the Clause is to require states to maintain substantially repre-
sentative democracies through the use of traditional separa-
tion-of-powers techniques, some measures may raise sufficient 
concerns to interest courts in the line-drawing process such an 
inquiry would seem to require. 
Even if a court concludes that the Guarantee Clause im-
poses more-than-minimal requirements on state government, 
establishing where the floor for republican government lies will 
be an interesting task. Originalist interpretations of this ques-
tion tend to yield a more limited set of requirements, given the 
Founders’ toleration of diverse forms of state governments.75
In New York, the Supreme Court hinted at a possible ap-
proach to adjudicating Guarantee Clause claims based on fed-
eral legislation aimed at state governments. Without deciding 
the justiciability question, the Court found that neither federal 
monetary incentives for the state to dispose of radioactive 
waste nor the exclusion of waste producers from disposal sites 
in other states denied “any State a republican form of govern-
ment.”
 An 
interpretation done through the lens of political theory—with 
less fluid definitions of “republic” and “democracy”—will proba-
bly yield a more robust set of requirements.  
76 The Court reasoned that, because the States had a “le-
gitimate choice” whether to accept the federal incentives, they 
retained “the ability to set their legislative agendas” and “state 
government officials remain accountable to the local elec-
torate.”77
While some of New York’s criteria—state control over legis-
lative agendas and state official accountability—may shed light 
on what constitutes “republican” government, they shed little 
light on how the Court would come out on other challenges, 
such as limits on a state’s taxing and spending powers that are 
not imposed by federal legislation but adopted by the states 
themselves. In New York, the claim was that federal legislation 
was denying the states the ability to maintain an autonomous 
government. The focus was on the distribution of power be-
tween the states and the federal government, not on the distri-
bution of power within a state. The latter scenario raises a 
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much harder question: whether legislative control and electoral 
accountability can even be threatened when both voting and 
lawmaking remain exclusively within a state. A court’s review 
of a particular piece of legislation passed under a state initia-
tive or voter referendum will highlight the difficulty of judicial 
line drawing in this situation.  
  CONCLUSION   
The point of this Article has not been to consider the legal 
merits of a challenge to the state initiative power or particular 
measures resulting from that process, but to outline some of 
the concerns and questions in any Guarantee Clause challenge. 
It seems inevitable we are likely to see more Guarantee Clause 
claims directed at products of direct democracy. The political 
climate is polarized and factions on each side of the aisle are 
resorting to various initiatives and referendums to bypass 
stalemated or reluctant state legislatures. Meanwhile, their re-
spective opponents will continue to use the courts to stop them. 
But the introduction of the Baker factors in future cases 
and New York’s statement that the justiciability bar may not be 
absolute has given courts an opening to consider the 
justiciability of Guarantee Clause challenges. Unless the Su-
preme Court speaks otherwise, lower courts might take up the 
challenge. Yet it is still uncertain whether courts will know 
where to go with Guarantee Clause claims once they have 
crossed the justiciability barrier. 
 
